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BOOK REVIEWS
ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT. By Paul A. Freund.'
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949. Pp. vii, 130.
The Supreme Court has provided subject matter for many books, articles,
and book reviews. Seldom, however, has it been treated with such insight
and wisdom as in this small volume by Professor Paul Freund, which is the
product of three lectures delivered in April, 1949, at Northwestern University
Law School under the auspices of the Julius Rosenthal Foundation.
Professor Freund's experience and background make him exceedingly
well qualified for an appraisal of the Supreme Court. He studied the Court
and its traditions as a student of Professor Felix Frankfurter. He continued
his study as a law clerk of Mr. Justice Brandeis, a rare privilege which gave
him the opportunity "to appraise at first hand the effect on judicial judgment
of varying policies and values, political and economic."12 After this experience
he became one of the select staff in the Office of the Solicitor General, where
he took part in the preparation and argument of many of the Government's
cases in the Court during the early New Deal period when constitutional law
was a flourishing and exciting subject.8
Understanding the Court must begin with a study of its position as an
institution in our society and the significance to our democratic principles of
the resolution of problems presented to it during each Term. 4 In one sense,
the Court is the creator and builder of the kind of democratic principles we
should and must live by. It is for this we look to it for guidance to prevent
us from veering too far to one side or the other and to show us how to
apply our democratic traditions to everyday living.
While playing this role, the Supreme Court must function as a court of
law: it is hemmed in by the judicial process. The Court is at the pinnacle of
the federal judicial system, and, within the confines of the Constitution, it is
1. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2. Roberts, Book Review, 63 HARV. L. Rav. 1080, 1081 (1950).
3. Professor Freund again served with the Solicitor General's staff during the recent
war period.
4. E.g., in the 1948 October Term, the Supreme Court was presented the question to
what degree municipalities could prohibit sound trucks without violating the constitutional
right of free speech, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949) ; the question whether con-
viction of a stirring speaker, surrounded by disorder, for breach of peace violated his
constitutional right to speak, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949); the question
whether security in one's home and effects was protected constitutionally from state
officers under the Fourteenth Amendment as it is from federal officers under the
Fourth Amendment and whether evidence secured by such illegal means could be ad-
missible in the state courts against the defendant, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949).
For a full resum6 of the 1948 Term, see Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1948-
49, 17 U. OF Ci. L. Rav. 1 (1949) ; and Comment, The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63
HAR . L. Rav. 119 (1949).
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the tribunal of ultimate appeal for the courts of the forty-eight states, the
territories and possessions. As the author puts it, its primary problem is
the "problem of reconciling the One and the Many: one nation and many
states; one Supreme Court and many organs of government; one Court
speaking with many, often disconcertingly many, voices."' This is true in its
resolution of constitutional issues. It is also true in the interpretation and
application of congressional statutes in the federal courts and, under some
congressional acts, in the state courts as well.6
The author's first lecture, entitled "Concord and Discord," deals with
the cases in the field of civil liberties and demonstrates that individual Justices
must choose from a number of competing values to reach their decisions.7
The propriety of the description of civil liberties as "human rights contrasted
with property rights" is considered at length by Freund.' Admittedly, the
Court places civil liberties in a preferred position, possibly protected by a
presumption of unconstitutionality against infringing measures, when con-
trasted to the Court's approach to the broader areas of economic regulation.'
While Mr. Justice Frankfurter'0 and Judge Learned Hand" have protested
the placing of civil liberties in a preferred position within the confines of due
process, nevertheless, there has been broad accord on the Court in this
realm of values.' 2 "In short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law,
it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is
imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect."13
Looking at the problem as a contrast between freedom of expression and
right of property or the giving of one a preferred position over the other is
an oversimplification, tending to emotionalize thinking and to becloud wisdom
and understanding. In one sense, laws which enter the area of communication
of mind and spirit are as truly adjustments and accommodations as are laws
fixing prices or wages or controlling competition. The legislature must be
the adjustor in the first instance both with reference to freedom of expression
5. P. 7.
6. Examples of federal statutes in which federal and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction are the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 52 STAT. 1060, 1069,
29 U. S. C. §§ 201, 216(b) (1947) ; and the Federal Employer's Liability Act, as amended,
35 STAT. 65, 66, 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1948).
7. P. 9.
8. P. 10 ff.
9. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 88 (1949) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516,
530 (1945).
10. Concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 95 (1949).
11. L. Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46 COL. L.
REV. 696, 698 (1946).
12. Pp. 11, 12-14.
13. P. 11.
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and to "shifting economic arrangements."'1 4 But in so far as the role of the
Court under judicial review is greater in the one case than in the other, it is
not actually because one set of rights is preferred over the other. Rather
the difference lies in the function of the judicial process compared with that
of the legislative process in the totality of government. When we consider the
adequacy of the judicial process and the capacity of the Court to arrive at
minimum standards for the broad, flexible regulations necessary for determin-
ing rates and services of utilities, for example, the answer can only be that
the legislative and administrative processes have the greater capacity. The
due process principle of confiscation with all its requisite theories of valuation
is of small import. Basically, therefore, judicial deference in this field is
caused by the lack of competency of the Court in such matters, and only
confusion can follow in the wake of statements that the Court is without
power or that other rights are in a preferred position.
Moreover, it is essential to the preservation of a democratic society that
regulation of freedom of expression be withdrawn to a very great extent
from the legislative and executive processes. Such freedoms are individual
and personal and are not equities to be weighted and measured among dif-
ferent groups.15 They must be preserved for all individuals and all groups.
Such preservation falls within the special competence of the judicial process to
protect individual liberties from the overreaching of legislative and executive
processes. For the moment, the Court has left for experimentation in the
legislative process, and in the forum of public opinion, the question of how
much individual control over property is essential to human freedom. 6 But
the Court may eventually intervene to protect the individual's right over his
property as differentiated from the conflicts of larger economic interests.
Disagreements among the Justices of the Vinson Court, no less than
among those of the Stone Court, have been widely publicized. Criticism has
been levelled by members of the legal profession at the number of dissenting
and concurring opinions. 7  The author discusses three "themes of discord"
in the Court in the field of civil liberties, not as a single discord, but in three
14. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J.);
P. 11.
15. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943).
16. P. 20.
17. Cf. Palmer's articles published in the American Bar Association Journal, 34
A. B. A. J. 554, 677, 761, 887, 1000, 1092 (1948); 35 A. B. A. J. 13, 101, 189 (1949).
Palmer includes in his listings of the "Causes of the Justices' Disagreements" the
following:
A shift in constitutional interpretation from the concept of the
Constitution to be construed like any other legal document in the light
of the intent of its creators, to the idea of the Constitution as a living
organic instrument of government furnishing general ideals for thejudiciary to be adapted to the needs of a changing and changed society.
35 A. B. A. J. 189 (Emphasis added).
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distinct lines of conflict.' The first is called "aggressive and passive
liberties." Freund explains that on the whole "active proselyting interests
have been given greater sanctuary than the quiet virtues or the right of
privacy."" Obviously the "active proselyting interests" refer to the Jehovah's
Witnesses cases.2 ' The search and seizure cases, in which the individual has re-
ceived wavering protection from unauthorized invasion of his home and private
papers by officers of the law, are examples of the passive liberties.21  The
second theme of discord within the Court concerns whether the "clear and
present danger" principle is applicable to such situations as newspaper com-
ment interfering with the judicial process. 22  The third theme of discord
relates to the extent of the difference in the scope of review accorded state
as distinguished from federal action where individual liberties are involved.21
The cases show that the difference in understanding and application of
fundamental principles of our democracy cause divisions among the Justices
on the Court. The divisions do not always result from giving vent to personal
bias, a supposition of some writers and statistical analysts of the Court.2 4 Also,
it is not too commonplace to suggest that the Court best serves its function if
the Justices insulate from their considerations, or at least place in a proper per-
spective, the political and social pressures which move different groups in our
society. Such pressures are matters to be compromised in the processes of
elections and legislation. The Court's function is to consider the cases in the
broader perspective of government. For this, our democratic society needs the
seasoned and scholarly judgment of the Justices of the Supreme Court to b6
secured in an atmosphere of isolation. This is not the same as saying the
Court should be exalted. But it should not be expected that the Supreme
18. P. 22 ff.
19. P. 22.
20. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter and
Jackson, JJ., dissenting; held unconstitutional the application of municipal ordinance for
license tax to distribution of religious literature) ; Martin v. Strulthers, 319 U. S. 141
(1943) (Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter and Jackson, JJ., dissenting; held unconstitutional
the application of municipal ordinance forbidding door-knocking or bell-ringing to dis-
tribution of religious literature) ; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944) (Roberts,
Frankfurter and Jackson, JJ., dissenting) ; cf.. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158
(1944) (Jackson, Roberts and Frankfurter, JJ., concurring; Murphy, J., dissenting).
21. See notes 39, 41 infra.
22. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941) (Stone, C. J., Roberts, Frankfurter,
and Byrnes, JJ., dissenting) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946) (Frankfurter,
Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., concurring) ; Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., Vinson, C.J., and Jackson, J., dissenting).
23. Compare McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting),
with Adamson v. United States, 332 U. S. 56 (1947) (Black, Douglas, Murphy and
Rutledge, JJ., dissenting) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949) (Black, Douglas and
Jackson, JJ., concurring; Vinson, C. J., Reed and Burton, JJ., dissenting) ; Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944)" (Jackson, Roberts and Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., PRITCHTT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT, c.9, 239 ff. (1948).
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Court's decisions will always receive popular acceptance at the moment. Some
of the Court's greatest contributions have come in eras of incensed non-
acceptance of its decisions.
In addition, it should be recognized that many important considerations
presented to the Court are not only broad, difficult and soul searching, but,
in a sense, new. Principles of democracy are not so concretely and semantical-
ly definable as to pave the way for unified application by nine Justices of the
Supreme Court. The application to concrete situations of constitutional
principles based upon general theories of democracy must, from the nature of
things, be made in the face of competing social interests in our society. MkIr.
Chief Justice Hughes, in 1936, expressed amazement that amidst controversies
on every conceivable subject one should expect unanimity in opinions upon
difficult legal questions that go to the very core of our democratic way of
life.2' The history of theology, philosophy and economics, or indeed of any
intellectual discipline, is a long record of disagreement and controversy.
The Court's function as an institution of government may be better under-
stood by examining cases under each of the three themes of discord put for-
ward by the author with such sophistication and insight. The cases under
each of the three themes show the difficult problems which the Court must
wrestle with when it is required to face the awful responsibility for deter-
mining constitutionality by reconciling conflicts among our democratic
institutions.
A good example of the proselyting interests of the Jehovah's Witnesses
cases are the flag salute cases. Those cases presented the Court with the
problem of reconciling a conflict between state control over public education
and freedom in the exercise of religious beliefs. Public education and free-
dom of religion are cherished institutions and each must function without
destroying the other. In the flag salute cases boards of education, with or
without legislative authority, required flag salute ceremonies in the public
schools. Participation in the ceremonies conflicted with the basic religious
beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect.26 Refusal to conform with the boards'
orders was dealt with by expulsion of the children from the public schools
and prosecution of the parents for contributing to the delinquency of their
children. At first the Court handled the cases by per curiam decisions,2
25. Address of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, 13 PRoc. Aii. L. IxsT. 61, 64 (1936) ; P. 8.
26. The Jehovah's Witnesses sect draws on Chapter 20 of Exodus for its refusal to
salute the flag.
27. Leoles v. Landers, 302 U. S. 656 (1937) (appeal dismissed for want of a sub-
stantial federal question; 184 Ga. 580, 192 S. E. 218 (1937)) ; Hering v. State Board of
Education, 303 U. S. 624 (1938) (appeal dismissed; 118 N. J. L. 566, 194 Atl. 177 (1937),
117 N. J. L. 455, 189 Atl. 629 (1937)) ; Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306 U. S. 621 (1939)(cert. denied; 12 Cal.2d 85, 82 P.2d 391 (1938)) ; Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U. S. 621(1939) (rehearing denied, 307 U. S. 650 (1938), aff'g., 25 F. Supp. 918 (1939)).
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upholding the regulations upon the theory that no substantial constitutional
question had been presented. The issues received full dress review for the
first time in the case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis2 5 The majority,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, did not perceive the issue as one of
closing or narrowing the area for the exercise of freedom of religion. His
opinion was posited upon the principle of judicial review which severely limits
the Supreme Court's control over the legislative and administrative processes
of the state. The Court concluded that the legislative judgment properly
sought to provide order and unity in our society; this exertion of political
authority was to be sustained so long as basic considerations of religious
freedom were left inviolate. Here the exercise of religious beliefs invaded
the area of secular authority and it was not a question of the political authority
restricting the area of freedom of religion.
Mr. Justice Stone took a different view of the case which he expressed
in a powerful dissenting opinion.29 The issue which he perceived was the
restriction of the expression of one's religious beliefs through the exercise of
state control over public education; the right to express one's beliefs extends
beyond religious services into everyday living and the state was without power
under the Constitution so to deny. The state's power over public education was
not, in his judgment, on the same plane with the War Power of the Federal
Government to protect the very existence of our society, under which some
restriction on the expression of one's religious beliefs is recognized.30 The
Frankfurter-Stone debate, therefore, shows that the issue went, not to the
American Legion versus the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, but to the warp and
woof of a fundamental fabric of democracy.
The issue was reargued in the 1942 Term and the Court reversed itself.3'
The majority opinion on the reargument broadened the issue over that con-
sidered and decided by the majority of the Court in the first case. The issue
28. 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
29. Id. at p. 601.
30. Id. at p. 602. Mr. Justice Stone's citation of Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S.
245 (1934), with Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918), confuses state power
under the Fourteenth Amendment with the expansiveness of the National War Power.
The issue presented in Hamilton v. Regents was whether the power of the Regents over
the University of California was exercised so as to be in conflict with the religious be-
liefs of University students and therefore invalid under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Regents made R.O.T.C. compulsory; and the War De-
partment had not been empowered nor had it attempted to require military instruction in
the "land grant" colleges. It was not determined that the Regents' compulsory regula-
tion came under the War Power of the National Government. Neither was it deter-
mined that the state's police power over military training was equal to the National War
Power. For a similar confusion, see In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 572 (1945) -(Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting), where petitioner was denied member-
ship in the Illinois Bar Association because of a religious conscientious objection to war.
31. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
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decided in the second case was freedom of belief and expression in the broad
sense. The very purpose of the Bill of Rights, said the majority, was to
withdraw religious beliefs, freedom of mind and spirit, "from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, '32 and, for the most part, to place them beyond the
reach of legislative and administrative processes. 33 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in his dissent refused to accept the broad issue upon which the majority placed
its decision. For him it was still a question of religious beliefs being extended
beyond freedom from conformance to any enforced religious dogma. The
question still remained one of limiting the function of judicial review. And
he took advantage of the majority's weakness in its attempt to distinguish
Hamilton v. Regents. 34 According to the majority, the University trustees
could invade the area of religious beliefs because the students were not required
to attend the University. Such a position would mean that a state could dis-
criminate, even as to the expression of one's religious beliefs, in the conferring
of benefits, though not in the imposition of duties.
The willingness of the Court to protect the proselyting interests provides
an interesting comparison with its reluctance to accord equality of treatment
to the "passive liberties." History teaches that the right of individuals to be
free from unauthorized invasions of privacy is "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."35 The Revolution ended
the epoch of general warrants and the Fourth Amendment was enacted to
ensure that there would be no revival of such practices. 36 But history's teach-
ings are sometimes considered to be out of date and a hindrance to progress.
The question usually arises over the use of items seized, without authori-
zation of a search warrant, as evidence against the accused. It was long
a'go determined for the federal courts that material secured through uncon-
32. Id. at p. 638.
33. The concreteness of the majority's interpretation and application of the Bill of
Rights suggests for future cases a phrase of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948) : "This case . . . demonstrates anew
that the mere formulation of a relevant Constitutional principle is the beginning of the
solution of a problem, not its answer."
34. 293 U. S. 245 (1934). See Note 30 supra.
35. Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928).
Tucked away in this dissenting opinion is an inspiring and appreciative description of
the Bill of Rights:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions. of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
Professor Freund expressed a thought worth repeating that "in a police state there
can be few if any liberties more obnoxious and indeed impossible than the liberty to record
and transmit one's thoughts and one's transactions without fear of the unchecked official
eavesdropper." P. 24.
36. Fraenkel, Coitcerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARv. L. REv. 361-6 (1921).
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stitutional searches and seizures was not to be used as evidence.37 The basic
conflict in the search and seizure cases may be said to be between crime detec-
tion and apprehension of the criminal on the one hand, and the right to be free
from unwarranted invasion of one's privacy in his home and personal effects
on the other. The fact that some criminals may escape punishment is part
of the price which must be paid to protect this right so fundamental to a
democracy.
The Court has retained the language of its opinions prohibiting the
use in evidence of items illegally seized.38  It has come close, however, to
achieving a practical abolition of the rule by continual diminution of the
area in which the rule is held applicable. It has done so first by creating
an illusive and expanded concept of "public documents," and authorizing
coercive visitation on the part of government agents to seize such documents.3"
Before the "public documents" case, searches and seizures without a warrant
were "unreasonable" and illegal except search of the person upon arrest or
search of moving vehicles.4" A second means used to make the search not
"unreasonable" and to permit the use of items seized as evidence against
the accused has been an extreme expansion of a concept, developed formerly
by a few lower federal courts, of "search incident to arrest."41 If the arrest
37. Weeks v. United States, 332 U. S. 582, 587 (1946); cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U. S. 25 (1949).
38. Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 587 (1946) : "The law of searches and
seizures . . . reflects a dual purpose-l-protection of the privacy of the individual, his
right to be let alone; protection of the individual against compulsory production of evi-
dence to be used against him."
39. The problem arose in one of the many O.P.A. cases during the recent war. The
defendant operated an incorporated gasoline station and the attendant sold gasoline at
twenty cents a gallon above the ceiling price to Government agents without securing in
return the necessary coupons. The agents arrested the defendant and demanded entrance
into a locked room upon a theory, somewhat astonishing but not too astonishing to be
later accepted by the Court, that the coupons were "property of the Government" for
which defendant was a mere custodian. Cf. Frank, J., in case below, 151 F.2d 140, 144
(2d Cir. 1945). Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, analogized that the Govern-
ment was in the same situation as a man whose property has been stolen and who attempts
to take it from one unlawfully in possession. The Court also made mention of the fact
that the coupons were kept in a business establishment, implying that the Fourth Amend-
ment may not secure offices or other places of business. Davis v. United States, 328
U. S. 582 (1946) (Frankfurter, Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
40. Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 168 (1947) (Frankfurter, 3., dissenting);
cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949).
41. Five agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation entered defendant's apartment
under the official authorization of a warrant for his arrest. Without a search warrant,
the agents spent five hours ransacking a small, three room apartment looking for two
stolen checks. Among fresh laundry in a bureau drawer they found an envelope con-
taining forged draft cards. Now, says the Court through Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, "It
is equally clear that a search incident to arrest, which is otherwise reasonable, is not
automatically rendered invalid by the fact that a dwelling place, as contrasted to a business
premises, is subject to search." (Emphasis added.) The Court seems to find an additional
reason that since the search was successful in turning up fruits of crime the search there-
fore became valid. Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947) (Frankfurter, Jackson,
Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
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is valid, either by warrant of arrest or by any means recognized under the
law of arrest such as commission of criminal acts in the officers' presence, the
constitutional limitations to search and seize without a valid search warrant
appear to be lifted almost entirely.
The Court in the recent cases has been groping for a test-a block of
words, anything-to uphold federal officers and investigators in their con-
tinuous refusal to secure a search warrant.42 A good example is the majority
opinion in United States v. RabinoWitz, 43 where it is stated:
Assuming that the officers had time to procure a search warrant,
were they bound to do so? We think not, because the search was
otherwise reasonable, as previously concluded. . . . To the extent
that Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, requires a search
warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it
rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after lawful arrest,
that case is overruled. The relevant test is not whether it is reason-
able to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was
reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and cir-
cumstances-the total atmosphere of the case. (Emphasis added.)
Such an approach lowers consideration of the historical protections under the
Fourth Amendment to the level of the "scope of employment" cases in the
law of agency where, in the end, the employer always pays; the individual
likewise will always pay, not with his insurance dollars, but with his constitu-
tional liberties. The majority opinions in the recent search and seizure cases
give little recognition to the historical inter-relation of the Fourth Amend-
ment to our democratic principles with the consequence of shocking inroads on
individual liberties.44
The other two "themes of discord" in the Court which the author dis-
42. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948), Mr. Justice Jackson in
the majority opinion emphasizes the need for search warrants as follows:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any as-
sumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested
determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in mak-
ing a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a
nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of
police officers.
43. 70 Sup. Ct. 434, 435 (1950).
44. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinions offer a decided contrast to the
majority opinions: e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 594 (1946) ; Harris v.
United States, 331 U. S. 145, 155 (1947). A statement of Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818, 820 (2d Cir. 1947), should give us pause:
"If the prosecution of crime is to be conducted with so little regard for that protection
which centuries of English law have given to the ilidividual, we are indeed at the dawn
of a new era; and much that we have deemed vital to our liberties, is a delusion."
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cusses are as fundamental as the first but are too broad to be properly
canvassed in a book review. They ought, however, to be mentioned. One
involves the conflict between the integrity of the judicial process to be
preserved against outside pressures and the right of constitutional free speech
to talk about and even to criticize the judicial process. The Court has said
that there must be a showing of a "clear and present danger" of an inter-
ference with the judicial process.4" A minority insists the principle is inap-
plicable; that the matter should be left largely in the hands of the state
under a limited judicial review: and that if the freedom of newspapers is
carried too far, the integrity of the judicial process will thus be endangered.46
The reviewer agrees with the author that the problem is too broad and involves
too many values to solve by reliance on the efficacy of the phrase "clear and
present danger."4 Reliance on such a phrase as a protective concept provides
no greater protection in unskilled hands than the "tendency test" of the
Gitlow case which today is in general disrepute. 8 The question involved is the
actuality of the subjugation of the judicial process, a social misuse of the
power of the press, weighed against the social interest in the freedom of the
press. The determination of the area of protection of such interests and values
cannot properly be made by reliance on analytics.
The third area of discord within the Court involves the power it should
exercise over the judicial process in administration of criminal justice. The
Court has here exercised considerable control over the federal courts without
relying on constitutional restrictions, although the cases have due process
undertones. 49  But the Court's control over the criminal process in the state
courts must be restricted to the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment.50
One faction of the Court wishes to apply the protections contained in the
entire Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment."' The other view,
now in the majority, is of the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects only against the absence of the fundamental requisites of due process
determined by the Court in the particular case. 52
45. See note 22 supra.
46. See dissenting opinions in Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 279 (1941);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 384 (1947).
47. Pp. 27-8.
48. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 670, 671 (1925).
49. E.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
50. E.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50 (1949).
51. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, Douglas, Murphy and
Rutledge, JJ., dissenting). For an exhaustive treatment of the play of history, see Fair-
man, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV.
5 (1949). See also, Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Supreme Court, 46 MicH. L. REv. 869 (1948).
52. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947) ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 461-2,
473 (1942); cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 328 (1937); Twinning v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 96, 100 ff. (1908).
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The author's second lecture presents a portrait of Louis Dembitz
Brandeis after his appointment to the Court. Freund suggests that donning
the judicial robes insulates men to some extent from the ties of the past. This
factor is often forgotten when a particular Justice fails to vote as anticipated.
"Donning the judicial robes" is also deeply personal, a transformation from
the active life to spiritual loneliness: not even his closest friends are able to
understand the humbling feeling of inadequacy that overcomes a new Supreme
Court Justice as he weighs his obligation to history.
In this second lecture Freund superbly paints for his readers the great-
ness of Mr. Justice Brandeis. The author's description is of a "morality of
mind," the elements of which are: "(1) an insistence on knowledge as in-
dispensable to judging; (2) a rejection of opportunism; (3) an insistence
on jurisdiction and procedural observances; and (4) a rejection of senti-
mentality.""3
Understanding the record, the facts as raw data, is one of the most
difficult tasks in appellate judging. Its primary significance all too often
is not recognized. It is indeed a key to the greatness of Mr. Justice Brandeis,
his recognition that the facts are the touchstone of every case, the fountain.
head of the judicial process.1 4 Brandeis' presentation of facts had all the art
of a masterpiece. In his opinions the facts were not mere hurried reportings
to be -disposed of prior to concentration on legal analysis and discussion of
precedents. The issues to be decided were drawn from description of the
facts in the context of reality and the social forces involved. He never
confused the facts with their legal connotations; nor did he allow precedent
and legal analysis to control the presentation of facts. This often placed
Brandeis in a different intellectual world from some of his brethern on the
Court.55 For example, in the Duplex case,"6 Mr. Justice Pitney, who spoke
for the Court, dealt with the case as one of malicious injury by employees to
the property of their employer and the resulting stoppage of commerce. But
Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that there were only four manufacturers of
printing presses in the country, that all save the Duplex Company were
organized, that the effectiveness of the union shop in the other three com-
panies was threatened by competition from the nonunion shop, and that the
53. P. 50.
54. Many tragic examples could be cited where the fact finding portion of the
judicial process was an empty form or was thwarted to reach a particular result. E.g.,
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940). Indeed, fact finding of high performance
gives the judicial process its protective firmness. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 54 ff.
(1949).
55. Hamilton, The Jurists Art, in FRANKFURTER (Ed.), MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, 171,
178 (1932).
56. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) (Brandeis, Holmes,
and Clarke, JJ., dissenting).
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purpose of the boycott was the preservation of wages and working condi-
tions of union employees. 7 The vital issue in the case then, as presented by
Mr. Justice Brandeis, was the legal limits of union activity in our industrial
society. These facts, attuned to their economic and psychological counter-
parts, showed clearly that such group activity of the union was meant to be
freed from illegality in the federal courts under Sections 6 and 20 of the
Clayton Act.
Mr. Justice Brandeis' concern over matters commonly referred to as
jurisdictional and procedural caused some to say he was a "conservative"
in such matters as contrasted to his being a "liberal" in social and economic
thought or in matters of substance. Such labeling is misplaced. It is fair to
say that for him proper resolution of the problems of jurisdiction and pro-
cedure was necessary to the preservation of constitutionalism, especially where
the problem related to review of state courts or validity of state laws."8 Con-
cern over such matters cannot be separated from his thesis of encouraging ex-
perimentation in social and economic regulation generally in the states. In-
deed, such observances spring from his confidence in the legislative process.
For example, Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented in International News Service
v. Associated Press,59 not because he was against innovation by the Supreme
Court in proper situations, not because the Supreme Court was without
power or jurisdiction in any narrow sense, but because questions of news
pirating could be more effectively regulated by legislature than by the Supreme
Court.60 Again, his dissent in Pennsylvania v. West Virqinia61 demonstrated
that the Supreme Court was without specialized knowledge sufficient to deal
constructively with the problems of apportioning the natural gas resources for
the State of West Virginia.62  These cases, along with Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins 3 and numerous others 4 show that to Mr. Justice Brandeis "juris-
diction and procedure" were integral to lawmaking; indeed, these often con-
stituted the very essence of the constitutional case. He concurred in the
Whitney case65 because of defendant's failure properly to raise in the state
court the defense of "clear and present danger." His concurring opinion,
which the author calls "one of the classics in the literature of freedom of
57. Id. at p. 480.
58. P. 58.
59. 248 U. S. 215, 248 (1918).
60. P. 64.
61. 262 U. S. 553, 605, 610, 616, 623 (1923).
62. P. 64.
63. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
64. Cf. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 293 (1921) (dis-
senting) ; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933) ; Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 341 (1935) (concurring).
65. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 372 (1927).
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speech,"" " sprang from his concern not over something narrow and technical,
but from his belief in federalism, preserving to the states their proper sov-
ereignty. The fact that Mr. Justice Brandeis carried such concern to extremes
in the judgment of some, does not detract from the soundness of his position
or from the wisdom of the author in listing this concern as a key to the great-
ness of Mr. Justice Brandeis on the Court.
The reviewer to be candid must admit unhappiness with the other two
facets in the author's portrait of Brandeis as a Justice. "Rejection of oppor-
tunism" and "rejection of sentimentality" are like saying Brandeis was an
"honest judge." They are not distinguishing factors of the judicial art of
Brandeis. They are not distinguishing factors unless the author is prepared
to defend the position that many Justices of the Court, present and past,
are or were opportunists or sentimentalists. Such emotional phrases do not
delineate the character of the author's portrait.
Freund demonstrates that Mr. Justice Brandeis was capable of dis-
ciplining his mind against allowing strongly held and closely articulated
convictions on economic and social problems to control his work as a judge.
Thus, the fact that Brandeis disliked the limitation of production as a de-
pression cure did not prevent his writing a brilliant dissent in the New Slate
Ice case. 17 As a judge he was willing to permit the extension of state legisla-
tive power even to the point of carving a regulated monopoly out of a
competitive business."" He would not permit the Court to interfere with
state policy, though he thought the policy unsound. Freund is saying that
one of the keys to the greatness of Mr. Justice Brandeis is that he approached
the ideal of objectivity. This, of course, is a distinguishing greatness.
The third lecture is concerned with problems of constitutional litiga-
tion." The development of judicial review of legislation is a fascinating
subject. This art is restricted to those countries, like the United States, in
which the courts exercise the power of judicial review. Freund is concerned
primarily with the part counsel, the lower courts, and administrative
bodies play in constitutional litigation. Little is said about the responsibility
of the legislature in its role of articulated policy-making. "
The author observes that the quality and respect held by the Justices
for the lower tribunals (federal and state courts and administrative agencies)
influence constitutional validity; that since the era of Daniel Webster, the
ability of counsel both in oral argument and brief writing has had considerable
influence upon the outcome of constitutional litigation; and that "there are
66. P. 62.




other and subtler ways in which counsel have a crucial role to play in the
shaping of constitutional law. ' 7' ° The principal story of the lecture is about
those "other and subtler ways."
Constitutional questions presenting broad issues of policy necessarily
affect the power of government throughout the United States and are in
essence political questions; nevertheless, they are presented in the form of
ordinary litigation.7 1 There are instances in which the Court decided con-
stitutional issues when those issues were not properly before it, with un-
fortunate consequences to the nation and to the Court as an institution.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes aptly referred to these decisions as "self-inflicted
wounds.'72  For example, the Dred Scott case71 involved a colorable transfer
of a slave to create federal diversity jurisdiction.74 As the author suggests, the
consequence was an advisory decision on a grave constitutional question which
should have been averted. The Income Tax cases of 189071 were decided in
stockholders' suits when the corporation clearly had an adequate remedy at law
in payment under protest to recover the tax.7 6  Again, the Court was too
anxious to decide questions of constitutional law with dire consequences to the
financial future of the Federal Government. In the Income Tax cases the
Government lawyers were partially responsible for the failure to insist on
procedural inadequacy, giving little weight to their responsibility to the Court
to avoid a decision on the constitutional questions.7 7
The potential serious consequences of undue haste in constitutional de-
termination support the Court's strong policy of refusing to decide constitu-
tional questions "unless-and until it is necessary to the decision of an actual
controversy."7 8  The delicacy and enormity of the task of declaring a statute
or administrative ruling unconstitutional, the cumbrousness of the amending
process and the political impossibility sometimes of effectuating an amend-
ment, and the possibility that time and experience will aid the decision on the
constitutional question or a change will be effectuated through other processes,
all go to support the wisdom and strength of the Court's guiding principle.
The reviewer agrees, however, with the author's suggestion that statutes
enforcing actual or psychological impediments upon the freedom of expression
and the exercise of civil and political rights generally may provide justification
70. P. 82.
71. E.g., the validity of the gold clause legislation was decided in a case brought by
a bondholder against a railroad on a coupon for $22.50. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Pp. 82-3.
72. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 50-4 (1928) ; p. 83.
73. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1857).
74. P. 83.
75. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895).
76. P. 84.
77. Op. cit. supra, note 75, argument of The Attorney General, at p. 499 ff.
78. P. 108.
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for intervention without delay.79 The application of this exceptional treat-
ment may also take the form of invalidating on constitutional grounds the
entire statute in place of the particular interpretation."0 Invalidation of the
statute does not necessarily leave the legislature powerless to act; often the
consequence is to require greater responsibility in the legislature for caution
and carefully-channelled drafting, so necessary to the preservation of the
protections in the Bill of Rights.
The effect of counsel is also felt in the "Brandeis"-type of brief, in-
augurated in constitutional litigation in the Oregon Minimum Wage case.",
While it has proved helpful to the parties supporting the constitutionality of a
statute, usually the federal or a state government, by its very nature it has been
of little use to the party attacking the validity of the statute or regulation. It
may be said to be directed to the part "judicial notice" plays in constitutional
litigation in the Court, or the role of policy-making. The truth of the
material need not be determined so long as there is some evidence on which
a legislature can reasonably rely. Use of the Brandeis brief began in the era
when there was, in effect, a presumption against the constitutionality of eco-
nomic regulation. The social and economic data were used to justify legislative
crossing of the protective lines into the presumptively forbidden area. Time
and changing economic conditions have brought about a complete circle in the
Court's approach. The strongest possible presumption now favors validity of
regulatory statutes. The party attacking the statute's validity has an almost
insuperable burden of showing either that the legislature had an unreasonable
end in view, or that the means chosen were so unreasonable that reasonable
minds could not possibly have chosen them.82 Under the present approach
there seems to be little need for the social data brief by the proponent of the
constitutionality of the statute under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It may still be useful, however, when the validity turns on the
implied negative under the Commerce Power or on whether the state regulation
can exist alongside existing regulations under a federal statute. 3 In such cases
the degree of state interest plays a deciding role. In the due process case the
social data brief may, however, have psychological value in easing the Court's
decision, although the expense of it for private litigants may be a greater
burden than they should be asked to carry.
The author suggests that in some cases at least the data should be pre-
79. Ibid.
80. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101 (1940).
81. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908); p. 86.
82. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-4 (1938) ; Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 536-8 (1934).
83. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U. S. 761, 771 (1945).
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sented as evidence in the trial court to become a part of the fact-finding
process. Attacking counsel may then attempt to impeach or contradict the
data. While in due process cases the truth of the data on which a legislature
might have relied need not be proved, the validity of such data may be quite
relevant in commerce cases in weighing the burden on or interference with
commerce over and against the need for the state's social control.8 4 The
Court's reluctance to invalidate state legislation unless civil liberties are in
issue may, as the author suggests, cause counsel to move constitutional
litigation from the federal courts to the state courts by seeking relief under
the State rather than the Federal Constitution. There is no legal axiom
that state due process must have the same limitations over state legisla-
tive power as federal due process.85 When the Supreme Court speaks, the
legislative power of forty-eight states is in issue. Local problems may
justifiably play a greater role in application of state due process.
Understanding requires that the Supreme Court be considered in its
proper perspective in the totality of government. The Constitution must be
understood for what it is, an organic and protective document, furnishing
ideals as well as strength to all governmental institutions. The problems
faced by the Court are always those of government, whether of interpretation
and application of government in action or of definition of spheres of power
under the Constitution. Understanding also demands recognition that the
Court must assign regulation and control of economic activity, liberty of con-
tract and ownership of property, the area of freedom of speech and religion,
power to tax, and each of the others, its proper place and perspective among
the different processes of government. Many values, with many degrees of
competition and accommodation, play a large role. The true function of the
Court, then, we must admit "includes philosophy as well as law and states-
manship." 6
W. HOWARD MANNt
THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, by Samuel
J. Konefsky. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. Pp. xviii, 325.
There is ground for gratitude for any book which permits any improve-
ment in the public knowledge of the Justice, whose slight figure is now one
of the most picturesque and one of the most battered in the public eye on the
current judicial scene. For years, the Justice has been an almost constant
84. See, e.g., South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 192-6
(1938).
85. Cf. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN.
L. REv. 92 (1950).
86. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE, 333 (1947).
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